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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the Navy Flying Hour Program at
Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet (CNAP) in order to
understand the complexities and challenges of managing this
program at the Type Commander level.
An overview of the Flying Hour Program's budget formation
and approval process is presented in order to provide a basic
understanding of how fiscal resources for the Flying Hour
Program are derived, documented, and granted within the
Department of the Navy and the federal budget system. The
analysis on the Flying Hour Program then centers on the
specific procedures used at CNAP to ensure the efficient use
of funds while simultaneously maximizing program
effectiveness. Problems with managing the Flying Hour Program
at the Type Commander and recommendations for resolving them
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In accomplishing its primary mission of defending our nation, the Navy maintains
and operates a large and varied inventory of aircraft. Along with their aircrews, these
aircraft perform a variety of missions which include: air-to-air combat, air-to-ground
combat, antisubmarine warfare, early warning, electronic warfare, logistics support,
reconnaissance, transport, aircrew training and several others.
It is the responsibility of the Navy Flying Hour Program (FHP) to manage the
resources used for maintaining highly trained aircrews and mission ready aircraft. With
over two dozen types of aircraft, each with different variations or modifications and
located throughout the world with different operating requirements, the responsibility for
maintaining the material readiness of the Navy's air forces is no simple managerial task.
The importance of the Navy's Plying Hour Program is summarized in a report
prepared by the General Accounting Office (GAO) for the chairmen of the Subcommittees
on Defense, House and Senate Appropriation Committees dated July 1989. In this report
it states:
"The ability of the Navy to perform its mission effectively is critical to the defense
of the nation and its success in wartime. To that end, it is essential that the Navy's
tactical air forces, which strike naval and land targets, be flown by crews proficient
in their military flying tasks. These tasks, and related ship-based take-offs and
landings, are difficult and dangerous, requiring highly developed skills. The Navy's
primary means of developing and maintaining these skills is hands-on training
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through its Flying Hour Program, which funds the number of hours Naval aircraft
can be flown." [Ref. l:p. 2]
The importance of the Navy Flying Hour Program requires a thorough
understanding and critical analysis of its financial administration in order to improve
future effectiveness, especially in these times of increasing budgetary constraints.
B. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
This thesis describes the fiscal administering chain of command for the Flying Hour
Program, from Program Manager in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the
unit commanders who must use the funds provided to accomplish their operational
missions. Specific emphasis is given to Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet
(CNAP), who together with Commander, Naval Air Forces Atlantic Fleet, account for
over 80 percent of the Flying Hour Program's funding [Ref. 2]. It is at this Type
Commander level that fiscal guidance from above is translated into operational
requirements, and where budgetary justification is first formulated.
This thesis will analyze the Type Commander's role in the Flying Hour Program's
budget formulation and execution while identifying current problems encountered with
this complex and challenging responsibility. Finally, a summary of recommendations will




The primary source of information on the Flyag Hour Program was through
personal interviews with various participants at the Headquarters of Commander, Na; .d
Air Forces Pacific Fleet in San Diego, California. These included managers from the
offices of the Comptroller, the Force Material Officer and Force Readiness Officer.
Additional data was collected through telephone interviews with personnel at
various branches in the office of Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Air Warfare.
The remainder of data was collected through the review of numerous publications
an all aspects of the Navy Flying Hour Progrmm including: OSD, GAO, Navy and other
government reports, Navy instructions, related research papers and public articles.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into five chapters.
Chapter One provides an introduction to this thesis wheme the purpose, methodology,
and structure of the study are explained.
Chapter Two dezcribes the budget formulation process and administering of funds
above the Type Conbnander level. The inputs used !o jastify a budget request and the
chain of events to satisfy the Navy's Flying Hour needs will be presented.
Chapter Three discusses the specific management of Flying Hour Program funds at
the Type Commander level. The various components that make up the Flying Hour
Program will be examined along with the different management procodures used to
3
effectively coordinate them into a single program. Type Commander responsibilities with
budget formulation and program execution are presented to provide greater understanding
of the procedures used at this level.
Chapter Four documents several problems with managing such a large and complex
program at the Type Commander level.
Chapter Five summarizes the data presented and provides possible solutions to
problems identified. It also reveals areas of the Flying Hour Program that deserve further
research.
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H. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM FUNDING
This chapter presents the organization for budget formulation and program execution
of the Navy Flying Hour Program. An overview of the federal budget process is
presented for the purpose of providing a complete understanding of the flow of funds in
the Flying Hour Program. The document used as a basis for Flying Hour Program budget
requests and program execution, the OP-20 Report, is examined in detail to explain how
operational needs are translated into budgetary proposals.
A. BUDGET FORMULATION
1. Budget Formats
Budget formulation for the Navy Flying Hour Program involves two distinct,
but interrelated, formats. Both of these formats fre considered during the Planning,
Programming, and Budget System (PPBS) process which uses the information provided
to formulate the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and the Six Year Defense
Plan (SYDP). Described later, the first two years of the POM will become the budget
input that is submitted to Congrs. [Ref. 3 :p. C-16]
The first format of inputs considered is the program format which is, in turn,
utilized to form the program budget. This format uses Program Elements (PE) which are
groupings of forces, manpower, and costs associated with an organization, project or
function. [Ref. 3 :p. A-8]
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As shown in Figure 2-1, these Program Elements are grouped into one of
eleven major programs. The Navy Flying Hour Program is funded from three. of these
eleven programs. They are; (1) strategic forces, (2) general forces and (3) intelligence and
communications. The Navy Flying Hour Program further delineates the use of funds by
designating activity groups and sub-activity groups in each program, depending if the
funds are for Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO) or Aircraft Operation Maintenance (AOM).
See Table 2-1 [Ref. 4:encl (1)]. This program format for budget formulation is thought
to comprise the output side of the budget since it identifies what specific military
missions are being funded.
The other format used for budget formulation is the appropriation format. As
seen in Figure 2-1, this format delineates the budget by appropriation account. The Navy
Flying Hour Program fails into two appropriations: (1) Operations and Maintenance,
Navy (O&MN) for active forces and, (2) Operations and Maintenance, Naval Reserve
(O&M,NR) for reserve forces [Ref. 3:p. A-12B]. Although not always the case, the
O&MN and O&MNR appropriations are further divided into budget activities which are
numbered and categorized consistent with the major programs. The appropriation format
is considered the input side of the budget since it is what congress uses to disburse funds
to different DOD activities.
In FY 1988 program (2), general purpose forces, accounted for 56.5 percent
of the total Navy budget request while the other two programs which contains funds for
the Flying Hour Program, strategic forces and intelligence and communications,
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Figure 2-1 Program/Appropriation Relationship
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and because later discussion will concentrate on managing the Flying Hour Program for
active forces at the Type Commander level, the following discussion on budget inputs will
center on program (2), general purpose forces and the Operations and Maintenance, Navy
(O&M,N) appropriation.
2. Navy Chain of Command
Being the Responsible Office for O&M,N and O&MNR appropriations, the
Chief of Naval Operations has overall responsibility for the budget inputs to the Flying
Hour Program but this responsibility has been delegated to the Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Air Warfare (OP-05) and then even further down to the Special Assistant
for the Flying Hour Program (OP-05E). [Ref. 5]
When formulating Flying Hour Program inputs for eventual inclusion into the
executive budget, OP-05E analyses historical cost information for each type/model/series
(TMS) of aircraft in the Navy inventory. As shown in Figure 2-2, there are five major
claimants which comprise the Flying Hour Program [Ref. i:p. 14]. Of these, the two
Commander-in-Chief's account for over 80 percent of the total Flying Hour Program
budget. [Ref. 5] For such a large and complex program the CINC's delegate. virtually
all responsibility (not accountability) for the Flying Hour Program to the two Type
Cormnanders; Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet (CNAP) and Commander,
Naval Air Forces Atlantic Fleet (CNAL).
The Type Commanders submit execution cost data on their portions of the
Flying Hour Programs to OP-05E quarterly via the Flying Hour Cost Report (FHCR).
This report designates costs by activity group (AG): (1) Tactical/ASW Forces, (2) Fleet
8
TABLE 2-1 FLYING HOUR PROGRAM GROUPS
PROGRAM - ACTIVITY GROUP - SUBACTIVITY GROUP
Pro& _A9 SAG Tkite
Strategic Forces
A3 Strategic Communications
BF Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO)
BR Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM)
H General Purpose Forces
B2 Tatical Air & ASW Warfare Forces
BG Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO)
BU Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM)
B3 Fleet Air Support
BA Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO)
BB Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM)
M4 Fleet Air Tamiing
BD Aircraft Rlight Operations (AFO)
BP Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM)
m Intelligence and Communications
J7 Environmental/Prediction Support
BK Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO)
BV Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM)
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Air Support forces or (3) Fleet Air Training, and by sub-activity group (SAG): (1)
Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO), (2) Aircraft Operation Maintenance (AOM). [Ref. 6 :p. I]
AFO costs include those incurred for purchases of petroleum, oil and
lubricants (POL) consumed in the operation of aircraft. AOM costs are incurred with the
purchases of support and maintenance material other than POL. These are broken down
further into Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM) and Aviation Depot Level Repairable
(AVDLR). [Ref. 7:p. 9]
AFM costs are incurred when maintenance is performed at the organizational
or intermediate maintenance levels. If the maintenance required cannot be done at either
of these two levels, then it is turned over to an aviation depot where AVDLR costs will
be incurred. OP-05E takes a three year average of these historical operating costs from
the Flying Hour Cost Reporting System (FHCRS) for each TMS and multiplies them by
flying hour requirements. The method for calculating the hours required varies by
program segment and will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter.
The entire package of information on cost per hour (CPH) and required hours
is documented on the Operation Plan 20 (OP-20) Report. OP-05 takes the OP-20 Report
and checks the Flying Hour Program requests with other fleet proposals and the Defense
Guidance. [Ref. 8:p. 102] Once approved by OP-05, the OP-20 is incorporated into the
budget proposal for air warfare and submitted to the fiscal management division of the
CNO's office where it is reviewed by the Navy Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) to make sure
it is in agreement with NAVCOMPT Notice 7111 and for compliance with CNO
directives, and again the Defense Guidance. If NAVCOMPT does not agree with a
10
Figure 2.2 Flying Hour Program Organization
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portion of a program budget estimate, it will propose an adjustment called a "mark". The
submitting office must reply to a mark within 48 hours of receipt by giving a justification
called a "reclama". If the disagreement between the Program Office and NAVCOMPT
is not resolved with the reclama, the matter will first be referred to the CNO and then to
the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) for the final decision. Once disputes are settled,
NAVCOMPT assembles all budget submissions into a DON budget for SECNAV to
submit to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). [Ref. 3:p. B-70]
In OSD the Navy budget proposal goes through further scrutiny and is then
subject to budget hearings held jointly with the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). These hearings eventually produce the SECDEF's Program Budget Decision's




The CNO's method for recording historical costs of the Flying Hour Program
and projecting future costs is through the Operations Plan 20 (OP-20). There are several
types of OP-20 reports published depending on the information they contain. Some OP-
20's are published for the execution year on a monthly basis as Flying Hour Program
operating expenses are incurred. One of these, which summarizes the total costs for
program execution in the previous year, is called the history final and comes out in late
January of the current budget year. [Ref. 9:p. 12] These historical OP-20 reports help
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program managers at all levels keep track of their performance in program execution
since the report is broken down by budget activity (program) and by major claimant.
Another category of OP-20 has three versions and is used for stating future
requirements for the Flying Hour Program into next year's executive budget, otherwise
known as the POM year. There will be several revisions of this OP-20 as it proceeds
through the production and approval phases in the Department of Defense. There are three
main versions Congress commonly references. The first edition generated by the Program
Office for initial approval by higher authority is called the Program Objectives
Memorandum (POM) OP-20. Once approved by CNO, NAVCOMPT, and the SECDEF,
this report is referred to as the NAVCOMPT Final and the version that actually allocates
funds to the Flying Hour Program is know as the Congressional Final [Ref. 10:p. 20].
Of course, the Congressional Final seldom, if ever, matches the POM OP-20 or even the
NAVCOMPT Final. This usually means Flying Hour Program managers at the Type
Commander level must carefully decide how and where to use limited funds for flight
operations without negatively affecting safety, readiness or mission accomplishment. This
complex and challenging task will be the primary discussion in Chapter Three.
The last category of OP-20 pertains to the four years after the coming budget
year, referred to as the budget outyears. These are a projection of mission needs and
predicted costs involved for future flight operations, and are known as planning OP-20's.




The POM OP-20 is broken down into the following schedules:
1. Schedule A: TACAIR/ASW
2. Schedule B: Fleet Air Training
3. Schedule C: Fleet Air Support, Strategic Air, Environmental Prediction
4. Schedule D: Naval Air Reserve Forces, Naval Air Training and Recruiting
Commands and Naval Air Forces in Europe
Funding for the Flying Hour Program at the Type Commander level is
contained in schedules AB, and C. Each schedule uses different methods, inputs and
formulas for deriving the projected flight hour requirements. These are described below
in order of their percentage to the total Flying Hour Program funding. All use a historical
cost per flight hour (CPH), as defined earlier, adjusted for differences in factors such as
pricing and inflation by the Navy Comptroller. If a new type of aircraft is entering the
Navy inventory then these costs must be estimated or tied to the costs of an aircraft with
a similar mission, capability or function. Either way, these costs are usually only a rough
approximation. This is where the similarity between formulation technique of the
schedules ends.
a. TACAIRIASW Formulation
For TACAIR/ASW budget development, OP-05E collects the following
information from other divisions in OP-05 (DCNO for Air Warfare).
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Force levels of aircraft are projected for the year by TMS. This is
provided by a computer data base called the Aircraft Program Data File (APDF) and takes
into account new procurement or any losses during the previous year due to accidents or
retirement.
Crew manning is calculated by using a variable know as Crew/Seat Ratio
(CSR) which is the number of full aircrews per aircraft required for a particular TMS
aircraft to accomplish its mission. This figure is adjusted for variances in actual planned
manning by multiplying it by an Aircrew Manning Factor (AMF). For example, if the
designated CSR for an aircraft was 1.5 and there were 120 aircraft in the Navy inventory,
then the Flying Hour Program would need the resources to keep 180 aircrewmen (1.5 x
120) proficient and equipped. However, OP-05E will adjust this figure by the AMF
fluctuations in recruitment, retention rates, training command output, and losses to illness
or accident. The final number of projected aircrewmen, in this example, could range
anywhere from 126 (1.5 x 120 x 0.7) to 216 (1.5 x 180 x 1.2).
Prinary Mission Readiness (PMR) is the last factor needed for
TACAIR/ASW budget fonnulation and is the most subjective. The fleet commanders
have developed and the CNO has approved a training and proficiency syllabus for each
type of Tactical/Antisubmarine Warfare (TACAIR/ASW) aircraft. Each syllabus contains
a schedule of flying events that must be completed by assigned aircrew each year to stay
qualified in their particular aircraft. The number of hours required to complete all events
is known as 100 percent PMR. CNO has teken this number of hours and adjusted them
down to maintain a Navy wide rate of 87 percent PMR. Of this, two percent is accounted
15
for by the use of flight simulators, which are not funded by the Flying Hov,, Program,
therefore the aggregate Navy PMR rate supported by the Flying Hour Program is 85
percent. [Ref. 2]
Now, with all factors in hand, OP-O5E calculates the total dollar amount
to be included in the Navy's Flying Hour Program request.
No of A/C x CSR x AMF x PMR Hours x PMR rate x CPH = Total $
b. Fleet Air Training Formulalion
For Fleet Air Training (FAT) budget development, OP-05E again uses a
historical cost per flight hour (CPH) that may be different than the TACAIR/ASW CPH
even though it represents the same type aircraft. This is because of differences in support
needed, operating environment and mission requirements between eperating forces and
training squadrons.
Another factor needed by OP-05E to calculate the FAT budget is the
number of students to be trained. Students are programmed by category with each
different category requiring a certain number of hours to complete the training.
Obviously, a pilot just out of primary flight school would require more hours thain a pilot
that has previously flown this type aircraft in the fleet. These categories are:
1. A new crewman just out of primary training.
2. A transition crewman with fleet experienced but not in this particular aircraft.
3. A refresher crewman; Fleet experienced in this particular aircraft, but not current.
4 A refresher crewman with considerabl- experience in this type aircraft but not
current (prospective CO, XO, Air Wing Comm,,ander).
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5. Special student (ferry pilot, foreign pilot, etc.).
These hours awe summed together and adjusted for overhead flights such
as instructor proficiency, maintenance, weather aborts, etc. This total number of hours
is then multiplied by CPH to get total dollars required. This figure may be adjusted if
the number or type of aircraft changes or if the Pilot Training Rate (PTR) is varied
because of demand.
c. Fleet Air Support Formulation
Fleet Air Support budget development is based not only on historical CPH
but also historical utilization rates. Though other factors such as aircraft inventory are
considered, the major factors in calculating the funds required are previous execution
costs.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter h&c presented an overview of the budget formulation and approval
process for acquiring resources in support of the Navy's Flying Hour Program. It has
also begun to snow the importance and challenge of managing the program. With
funding "quests being based on historical cost performance, the fiscal manager
responsible for fiscal execution is torn between using allocated resources most efficiently
and the fact that savings made this execution year probably mean less funds given to the
program next year.
In this age of declining defense budgets, the Flying Hour Program will certainly get
its share of fiscal cuts but, like other programs, may not see a proportional cut back in
17
mission responsibilities. This means the operational commander must manage his portion
of the Flying Hour Program to ensure eyery dollar appropriated is usd in maximizing
optrational results. It is this vital management role of the operational commander to the
proper execution of the Flying Hour Program that will be examined in the next chapter.
18
M. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM AT CNAP
A. GENERAL
By the time the Navy Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) allocates Operations and
Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N) funds to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet
(CINCPACFLT) as a major claimant, and then CINCPACFLT reallocates a portion of
those funds to Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet (CNAP) in support of the
Flying Hour Program, the resources requested for flight operations seldom match the
resources provided. This is not only due to these times of shrinking defense budgets but
because of higher priority programs suddenly appearing, either from unexpected
occurrences such as natural disasters and third world conflicts, or because of decisions
from the higher level echelon, Another way funds are often reduced is the use of
appropriation withholds. These withholds are a small percentage of total the funds
provided to a program and are held in reserve by major claimant, Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) or NAVCOMPr for contingency purposes. They are usually returned
to the program intended if they were not needed by midyear. But these funds are not
always returned and this uncertainty adds to the management challenge.
Even without these cuts in program funding, the execution of the Flying Hour
Program at the Type Commander level is a complex and difficult process. This chapter
will examine the program execution procedures used at Commander, Naval Air Forces
Pacific (CNAP) for efficient and effective management of the Flying Hour Program.
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Simila, to classifications used in budgeting, the funding for executing the CNAP
portion of the Flying Hour Program is divided into two major areas which correspond to
sub-activity groups seen earlier. These are:
1. Aircraft Flight Operations (AFO); This includes petroleum, oil and lubricants
(POL) used during flight operations and any required flight equipment (helmets,
flight suits, survival equipment, etc.)
2. Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM); This is further broken down into
Aviation Fleet Maintenance (AFM) and Aviation Depot Level Repairable
(AVDLR). These provide all material and equipment necessary to perform
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance on aircraft at the organization!,,
intermediate and depot level. These also include all maintenance related support
equipment, tools and material used for flight operations.
The procedure CNAP uses to distribute these funds is by one of two means,
depending on the level of management responsibility given to the operating unit. One
way is by the issuance of an Operating Target (OPTAR). Almost ali funds for AFO are
distributed to aviation squadrons in the form of OPTAR's. Known collectively as
OPTAR Functional Category Zero One (OFC-01).
The other way CNAP distributes Flying Hour Program funds is through Operating
Budgets (OB) which are usually given to Naval Air Stations. These are given to Naval
Air Stations and are used extensively with AOM funding since most maintenance
facilities are located at air stations. When AOM is performed while deployed away from
an air station, then it is funded by an AFM OPTAR given to the maintenance facility, and
these are referred to as OFC-50 funds.
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Disregarding slight differences with expenses included as part of the OFC-01
category, these classifications are traced directly to the sub-activity groups explairned in
Chapter Two. The difference between OFC-01 fuids and those which wem'e budgeted as
AFO funds is that OFC-01 fhuds include several items that were originally budgeted as
AOM. This regrouping of funds occurs at CNAP in order to provide the squadron
commanding officer direct financial control over as many cons as possible which impact
on his squadron's safety. This also avoids some of the shifting in fund responsibility
from -.h.:p to station each time a squadron deploys.
The specific emphasis of tii chapter is to analyze each fanding category which
CNAP must manage in support of the Flying Hour Program and show how funds in each
are disbursed, used and reported.
B. AIRCRAFT FLIGHT OPERATION FUNDS
1. Fund Allocation
The expense limitation on AFO funds granted by CLNCPACFLT to CNAP is
further apportioned to subordinate aviation comniands with inputs from their operational
commanders using Operating Targets (OPTAR's), Operating Budgets (OB's) and
Annual/Quarterly Planning Figures (APF/QPF). The dollars provided from these
documents reflect estimated flight hour requirements of individual units, adjusted to
reflect funding constraints and utilized in conjunction with historical cost per hour
standards to compute aircraft flight operation grants APF's and QPF's are assigned to
the Commanding General of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Fleet (CO FMFPAC) for
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Marine Corps aviation units and to Naval Air Forces Pacific Fleet Carrier Air Wing
Commander's (NAVAIRPAC CAG's) for all squadrons assigned to air wings. The use
of APF's allows the forcetwing commander the ability to align resources as they deem
necessary to achieve operational and training responsibilities assigned. Basically, an APF
is a lump sum figure given to the operational commander which is divided between
several aviation squadrons at his discretion. QPF's are used as another management tool
for operational commanders to indicate to CNAP how annual funds should be allocated
into quarterly portions which also coincides with the time period which funds are granted
by CNAP. After these planning figures have been used to decide the timing and amount
of funds to be given to subordinate squadrons, the operational commander will submit
OPTAR Authorization Notifications to Fleet Accounting and Disbursing Center, Pacific
(FAADCPAC) and CNAP monthly. [Ref. ll:p. 11-1]
This allocation procedure pertains to all operational units in the
TACAIR/ASW category except for the fixed wing antisubmarine patrol aircraft (VP)
community and the light antisubmarine helicopter (HSL) community. For these
squadrons, inputs to determine operating targets are given to CNAP by the Functional
Wing (FUNCWING) Commanders; COMPATWINGSPAC for VP and
COMASWWINGPAC for HSL. [Ref. 2]
Fleet Replacement Squadrons representing the Fleet Air Training portion of
the Flying Hour Program and Fleet Air Support squadrons receive OPTAR grants directly
from CNAP. Finally, the aircraft assigned to various air stations on a permanent basis
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will have AFO requirements funded out of the base operating budget which provides
resources for the operation and maintenance of that facility.
The difference between Operating Target (OPTAR) and Operating Budget
(OB) is that an OPTAR is an administrative rather than legal limitation on expenditures
provided to an operating unit. The various OPTAR's which support the Plying Hour
Program come out of the operating budget that CNAP is responsible for managing. The
Operating Budgets of naval stations also come from CNAP but are managed by an
individual comptroller who, like CNAP, is subject to the legal statutes of U.S. Code 1517
during the life of the appropriation which supports that activity. In the case of the 0
&MN appropriation, this period is three years. [Ref. ll:p. U-1]
OPTAR holders are responsible for remaining within the OPTAR grant
assigned by CNAP and ensuring bills reflected on Summary Filled Orders/Expenditure
Difference Listings (SFO/EDL) are correct to ensure the OPTAR grant is not exceeded
during the three year life of the appropriation. Operating Budget holders have more
discretion on how funds are used but must still ensure flight operation funds are not used
for other purposes. (Ref. 11:p. M11-1]
2. Fund Execution
Once fiscal limitations of AFO funds are formulated with inputs from the
force and wing commanders and approved by CNAP, quarterly OPTAR grants are given
to each operating unit or squadron. Receipt of an OPTAR is considered authorization to
place obligations against CNAP funds up to the amount of the OPTAR grant. This
distribution of funds down to each operating unit means a further delegation of the
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responsibilities for proper and efficient use of Flying Hour Program funds to the squadron
commanding officer. Although this responsibility holds no legal consequences for poor
management of resources, commanding officer performance evaluations are based heavily
on fiscal administration of OPTAR grants. [Ref. 2]
When OFC-01 funds are used by placing orders for desired material, it
reduces the OPTAR funds available. The nature of the charge (fuel, oil, equipment, etc.)
is identified on the requisition document by a fund code. Along with the fund code, the
requisition records; type aircraft, operating unit, part number (if applicable), dollar value,
amount (gallons, units, etc.) and the transaction date. A copy of all requisitions are
processed at FAADCPAC in order to track and later verify total obligations by squadron.
At the same time, each aviation command is required to maintain a
Requisition/OPTAR Log to record obligations and report periodic information on
expenditures to the CAG, FUNCWING, and/or CNAP so they can monitor overall
program execution and to reconcile differences with FAADCPAC. This
Requisition/OPTAR Log is maintained by the squadron material officer but the accuracy
of the log is the duty of every pilot in the command since they will often have to sign
and retain a copy of the fuel requisition for incorporation into the log at the end of a
flight.
At the end of each month, squadrons will total obligations in the
Requisition/OPTAR Log by fund code and report the results to FAADCPAC, CNAP, and
their force commanders using the Budget OPTAR Report (BOR). [Ref. I l:p. IV-I]
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Since the majority of AFO funds are used for petroleum, oil and lubricants
(POL) used in flight operations and therefore their rate of use fluctuates directly with the
operating tempo (OPTEMPO) of aviation forces, it is very difficult to allocate quarterly
resources with a high degree of accuracy because it is nearly impossible to predict the
future need for naval air forces. It is therefore necessary to let some OPC-0! funds cross
the quarterly limits on their use. This is especially true for CAG's who have over 80
TACAIR/ASW aircraft which have been apportioned their operating funds on the basis
of projected operating cycle of the carrier air wing (CVW). As seen in Figure 3-1, even
a small change in the deployment cycle of a carrier air wing can equate to large changes
in PMR hours and therefore the OFC-01 funds required.
The variations on PMR shown in Figure 3-1 deserve further explanation at
this point. As explained earlier, the CNO has calculated the required number of flying
hours by TMS to be fully mission ready (100 percent PMR) and has required
TACAIR/ASW forces to operate at a minimum of 85 percent of this figure. This means
that annually, and on average, Navy and Marine Corps aviation units will fly 85 percent
PMR. This does not mean that every aircrewman will fly 85 percent PMR every month
or even for the year. Some squadrons will fly more than 85 percent PMR for a year
while others will fly less, but the Navy wide average will be 85 percent. Most
TACAIR/ASW units deploy onboard Navy ships and fly much more when at sea than
when back at a Naval Air Station. Operational commanders must have flexibility when
using their forces if they are to be effective in accomplishing their day-to-day missions,
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aid although they have the auhority for changing the PMR of each squadron under their
control, they are still responsible for the safety and training of those forces.
The fact that a change to the deployment schedule of a carrier air wing affects
the OPTEMPO of all squadrons assigned, means that the amount of operations may
fluctuate greatly below or above what was expected when QPF's were formed and
therefore CNAP has authorized CAG's to either carry-over five percent of one quarter's
QPF into the next quarter or to exceed a quarter's QPF by five percent for the first three
quarters of the fiscal year, Any carry-over in excess of five percent shall be reclaimed
by CNAP. This authorization is known as a zero-sum provision because it only changes
the timing of fund distribution, not the total amount. Any excess funds expended in the
first three quarters will be subtracted from the final QPF. [Ref. ll:p. MI-1]
For squadrons not assigned to a camrier air wing (CVW), the unobligated
balance shall be reclaimed by CNAP. This is because operating squadrons assigned to
FUINCWING or FMFPAC do not deploy on the same schedule with each other and
therefore changes in deployment cycles make small variations in overall OPTEMPO.
3. Budge, OPTAR Report
The Budget OPTAR Report (BOR) is due into FAADCPAC, CNAP and the
operational wing commanders by the second working day following the month of the
report. It is the BOR that is the primary financial management device used at CNAP for
administering the Flying Hour Program. It is also the basis for official accounting records
which form the inputs to the CNO Flying Hour Cost Report. The reason that BOR's are
used for official accounting of program execution and not requisitions processed at
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Figure 3-1 Carrier Air Wing Operating Cycle
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FAADCPAC is because BOR's provide the basis for obligational accounting while
requisition processing keeps tracks of actual expenditures. Obligational accounting is
somewhat like a personal checkbook, each time a unit contracts for goods or services it
decreases the balance in its account whether or not the bill for these goods or services has
actually been paid. These goods or services are given with the understanding that
reimbursement will be made sometime in the future. This commitment is called an
obligation. Once an obligation is liquidated and funds are disbursed, it becomes an
expenditure. In the long run obligations and expenditures should be approximately equal
but in the short run they can be quite different. A common reason for differences
between obligations and expenditures happens when pilots purchase fuel for their aircraft
while at either an Air Force base or overseas. The obligation for the purchase of fuel will
be recorded when the aircraft returns to it's home base, and reported to CNAP in that
months BOR. The requisitions for payment (when the obligation becomes an
expenditure) may not reach FAADCPAC for 12 months and, in the case of O&MJN
appropriations, can legally be paid two years after the year of execution.
It is the timeliness of the information on obligations which is the reason
CNAP, FAADCPAC, and operational commanders use the FOR as the primary tracking
device for Flying Hour Program execution. Its accuracy and timeliness is of extreme
importance since future funding decisions are contingent on past execution. There is a
BOR for each group of funds disbursed. These are distinguished from each other by an
OPTAR Functional Category (i.e. OFC-01, OFC-50). The AFO BOR reports:
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1. Obligations by fund code.
2. Total amount of OPTAR used.
3. Flight hours for the month and cumulative for the fiscal year.
4. Monthly fuel consumed,
CNAP receives, records, tracks and validates over 144 BOP's each month.
Discrepancies are reconciled with the reporting squadron and corrected when verified with
FAADCPAC records. [Ref. 12:p. 43]
The information provided by the BOR allows CNAP to insure that:
1. Financial transactions are not incurred in excess of funds distributed.
2. Funds are used only for the purpose they are intended.
3. Unliquidated obligations (unpaid bills) are reviewed periodically to nrei se fey
are still valid.
4. Funds not utilized at one unit can be redistributed among other commands.
5. A line of communication exists between CNAP and operating units to allow timely
transfer of financial concerns, needs or ideas.
6. An effective internal review program is tracking the performance of local program
managers.
C. AIRCRAFT OPERATING MAINTENANCE FUNDS
1. Maintenance Levels
Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM) funds are for the purpose of
supporting the maintenance requirements of the Flying Hour Program. These
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requirements are satisfied at one of thrft levei¶ in the Navy depending on the ,-omplexity
and uniqueness of the work to be performed.
The first level of maintenance is the most common or routine maintenance
performed on each type of aircraft. It is called organizational level (0-level) maintenance
because it is performed at the squadron, the organization which has direct control over
naval aircraft. This level of maintenance can range from washing the aircraft to changing
an engine. It includes whatever is necessary and within their capability to keep the
squadron aircraft operating at full mission capability (FMC), parts and expertis't allowing.
The most common use of AOM funds for organizational level maintenance, since labor
is not part of AOM, is for relatively inexpensive parts and supplies which are used in
large amounts called "consumables". These consumables are so named because once they
are used or worn, they are thrown away. Examples of consumables are: tires, bolts,
paint, soap, grease and paper towels.
Many times a part is found to be inoperative at the organization level and to
repair it is beyond the capability of the squadron. This is when the next maintenance
level will be used. Known as intermediate level (I-level) maintenance, this level consists
of maintenance facilities called Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments (AIMD's)
which are usually located on Naval Air Stations or air capable ships. AIMD's are
organized by the area of expertise. For example, a Naval Air Station would have an
AIMD for engines, electronics, hydraulics, and other appropriate systems.
This centralization of maintenance functions allows AIMD's to use specialized skills,
equipment and parts more efficiently then if they were handled at every squadron.
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If an AIM determines that the maintenance required is beyond their
capability or the squadron maintenance manuals indicate that it is not an AiNW
repairable, then the third level of aviation maintenance is required. This is known as
depot level maintenance and the items requiring this level of maintenance are known as
Aviation Depot Level Repairables (AVDLRs). Depot level maintenance is where the
complex and timely overhal work is accomplish, whether it is a electronic circuit
board or an aircraft engine. These maintenance functions are centralized throughout the
United States at sites called Naval Air Rework Facilities (NARF's). Unlike AIMD's,
NARF'& are not located at every Ndval Air Station and the ones that are do not always
ser•,e the requirements of every type of aircraft at that station. This means that parts
requiring depot level maintenance must sometimes be shipped great distances for repair.
This is not to say every time a squadron needs depot level maintenance it must ship the
part to the appropriate NARF and wait until it is returned.
When a part requires Depot Level Maintenance the squadron will turn in the
part to an AIMD and draw a good one out of the inventory of parts held there and that
are ready for issue (RFI). AIMD's are usually stock points for parts they are responsible
for repairing. If the broken part can be repaiLed by the AlMD, it is repaired and returned
to the RFI inventory. If it can not be repaired at the AMID it is shipped to the
appropriate NARF for repair or replacement. A good part is returned to the AIMD and
put back in the RET inventory. This allows for greater availability of replacement parts
but also complicates the management of the supply system.
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If depot level maintenance is required on a large assembly of the aircraft or
the airframe it sometimes becomes more fiscally efficient to send a team of NARF
technicians to the location of the aircraft to complete the required maintenance. The
funds for this maintenance will still come from the ship or station which were allocated
AOM funds for support of that particular aircraft.
Naval Air Rework Facilities also conduct extensive overhauls on naval aircraft
that can only be completed at the NARF location. These periodic inspections cover
every system on the aircraft and usually include stripping and repainting the aircraft.
Though this is depot level maintenance being performed, it has been planned and
budgeted into the purchase of the aircraft and therefore is not charged to AOM funds and
not considered in the management of the Flying Hour Program. [Ref. 2)
2. Fund Allocation
In the latter half of the 1980's, it was recognized that improvement in
manging the Aircraft Operations Maintenance funds was possible but required a working
knowledge of aviation maintenance activities. It was at this time that the responsibility
for allocating AOM funds and monitoring the execution of those funds at CNAP was
transferred from the off •e of the Force Comptroller to a new office in the department of
the Force Readiness Office.-. This office, known as the AVDLR/AFM Project Office, not
only has individuals who have management expertise and experience in the areas of Navy
supply and accounting but also those who have an in depth knowledge of how aviation
maintenance progiams operate. This office took over the major functions of managing
AOM resources. These functions as listed in the local mission statement include:
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1. Malnage the distribution of AVDLR/AFM funds within the Flying Hour Program.
2. Evaluate subordinate unit program execution/operations to determine effectiveness
of management controls, operating procedtdres, organization, and work load with
the principle emphasis to improve AVDLR/AFM management effectiveness.
3. Coordinate, review, and recommend policies and procedure.
4. Integrate efforts of staff functionaries in the areas of material, supply, and
comptroller to ensure consideration of AVDLR/AFM resource issues.
5. Strategic planning and corporate information management.
This does not mean the Force Comptroller has given up - mplete
responsibility of this portion of the Flying Hour Program. It means the Force Comptroller
and CNAP recognized that the complexity of allocating and tracking AOM funds required
an office with specialization in that area.
Budgeting and accounting for AOM, as for all of the FHP, still is the comptroller's
responsibility. AOM allocation and execution decisions by the AVD[R/AFM Project
Office are coordinated within CNAP to coincidc with an overall effective Flying Hour
Program.
One of the first goals of the newly formed AVDLR/AFM Project Office,
which was another reason for its creation, was to determine a set of aircraft operating
variables which could be put into a formalized database and used to allocate AOM funds.
Though much progress has been made in identifying those variables that affect AOM
costs; such as aircraft type, age, geographic location and deployment schedule, no
formalized equation or computer system has been developed for predicting AOM costs.
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Therefore the allocation of AOM funds is formulated as It was before this new office was
esta•i•ihed. [Ref. 13]
As with AFO funds, AOM funds are allozated by CNAP granting quarterly
OPTAR's and annual operating budget OB's to umits responsible for supporting
maintenance r-quirements. For Naval Air Stations and Naval Air Facilities, CNAP uses
NAVCOMPT Form 2168-1 to authorize obligations for AOM as putt of that station's
Operating Budget. The amount of funds allocated is usually on the basis of historical
execution with adjustments made for fiscal constraints, changes in number/type aircraft,
and inflation. This means historical cost per flight hour for AFM and AVDLR is
multiplied by the projected hours per TMS to get funds required by type of aircraft.
These are then allocated based on which stations or ships will support these aircraft and,
in the case of deployable aircraft, at what times. Program elements within the Fleet Air
Training and Fleet Air Support budget categories are applied directly to the station which
supports those aircraft. For example, PE 2425 IN is for training P-3 aircrew and NAS
Moffett Field provides support for VP-31, the P-3 fleet training squadron. Therefore,
NAS Moffett receives the majority of AOM funds associated with PE 2425iN on its
operating budget. rRef. 4:P. Mn-1]
For air capable ships which support deployed aviation squadrons or
detachments, and for Marine Corps aviation units, AOM funds are provided by AOM
OPTARS which also coincide with funding decisions made for AFO resources. These
ships or MAGS (Marine Air Groups) are to report AOM obligations to CNAP by use of
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Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM) budget OPTAR reports (BOR's). [ Ref. 4:, encl
(3)]
For squadrons conducting organizational maintenance, AOM finding is
provided as part of CNAP's AFO grant and AOM obligations are to be reported on a
single flight operations BOR. This simplifies the administrative reporting requirements
for squadron commanders. Upon receiving squadron BOR's, CNAP will gather costs by
the appropriate account from which funds were provided.
Transient aircraft which are solely supported by a CNAP station or ship for
a period of a week or less, will have all costs of aircraft maintenance funded by the host
station's operating budget and reported in the station's flying hour cost report or the host
ship's OPTAR and reported on the AOM budget OPTAR report. If transient aircraft
require support for more than a week, the host station or ship should attain funding from
the transient aircraft's controlling custodian (i.e. CNAL, CNARF or CNET) prior to the
aircraft's arrival. In this case, costs are not reported to CNAP on FHCR/AOM BOR but
to the controlling custodian by separate correspondence (SEPCOR).This action allows
CNAP to build the cost of supporting transient aircraft into the AOM budget base. [Ref.
4:encl (3)]
In cases where AOM funds allocated are insufficient for a units needs, a
request for additional funds may be submitted to CNAP if one of the following has
occurred:
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I. Abnormally high costs brought about by specific maintenance efforts or poorly
designed material. An example of this was seen when defective parts in the F-18
tail section were discovered and needed to be replaced.
2. Unexpected increase in cost of parts or material due to either rate of use or price.
Since many items are purchased outside the Navy Supply System (Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA), Government Service Agency (GSA), DOD stock fund,
etc.) prices can rise unexpectedly.
3. An unexpected need to increase repair capability. A station/ship may find that it
needs new equipment or materials to keep the aircraft mission capable.
Funds provided in response to augmentation requests will come from either.
1) a surplus of funds from another unit, 2) a funding augment or return of a withhold
from higher authority, 3) an early allocation of funds from a later quarter, or 4) the
balance of funds at CNAP obtained through AVDLR credits. This last source will be
explained in greater detail later in this chapter.
3. Fund Execution
a. General
Whenever maintenance is performed on Naval aircraft, the action required
and material used is documented on a standard form known as a Visual Information
Display System /Maintenance Action Form (VIDS/MAP). If the maintenance is
completed at the squadron (organizational level) maintenance department the VIDS/MAF
is closed out by squadron personnel and a copy showing material used is sent to the local
accounting activity. If parts are found which need a higher level repair capability than
available at the squadron, a copy of the VIDS/MAF is attached to the part and it is
forwarded to the nearest AIMD for repair or replacement. If repaired, AIMD will
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annotate the amount of I-level maintenance performed on the VIDS/MAF before sending
a copy to the local accounting activity. If the item is beyond the capability of
maintenance (BCM), AIMD will annotate a standard charge for replacement and ship the
part to a Designated Overhaul Point (DOP) for required depot level repair work. If the
old part is not available for turn-in, a higher price is charged and a credit is given when
the old part is received by supply.
b. Accounting and Reportng
In order to collect AOM costs and relate them specifically to the budget
activity, sub-activity, program element and TMS aircraft for which they were budgeted,
CNAP requires certain accounting and reporting procedures from the major users of AOM
funds. This information is fed into CNAP's Flying Hour Cost Analysis System (THCAS)
and correlated with FAADCPAC official records on AOM obligations to validate the
accuracy of information prior to submitting to OPNAV for use in budget formulation.
For AOM OPTAR holders, such as air capable ships and Marine Corps aviation units,
accounting for AOM fund execution is similar to the procedures used by squadrons to
report AFO fund execution. The exception being that squadron BOR's do not need to
explicitly specify AG/SAG or TMS of aircraft since it is derived from the squadron's
identification. Since AOM services at the Intermediate or Depot level are provided to
several squadrons, it is necessary to identify the recipient of services provided. This is
accomplished through the use of Type Equipment Codes (TEC's), which are four letter
codes annotated on all maintenance forms and requisitions. Every TMS aircraft in the
Navy/Marine Corps inventory is given a TEC and a different TEC is given for the same
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type aircraft used in different activity groups, (i.e. TACAIR/ASW, FRS and FAT). All
major components of aircraft (engines, tranmmissions, landing gear, ejection seats) also
have their own distinct TEC.
In order for CNAP to properly manage the execution of AOM funds and
to attain future funding levels for each TMS aircraft commensurate with actual AOM
costs, it is critical that costs are correctly matched to Type Equipment Codes (TEC) of
the final consumer. Activities providing AOM services arc to ensure that the combined
total dollar value of costs assigned to the TEC for miscellaneous costs is less than ten
percent of the total activity's AOM allocation. The greater the dollar value of
miscellaneous costs, the less accurate the AOM costs for a particular aircraft. Through
accurate and timely reporting, CNAP is able to: 1) correct deviations between budgeted
and reported AOM costs per hour, 2) reprogram AOM funds during the fiscal year in
order to maximize the effectiveness of these funds, and 3) prevent future fiscal year
budget reductions in AOM caused by faulty reporting. [Ref. 4:encl (5)]
Shore activities with their own Operating Budgets structure their
accounting of AOM fund execution by using a job order system to collect costs by the
appropriate AG/SAG (i.e. TACAIR/ASW, FRS, FAS, and APO or AVDLR) and to report
costs by the appropriate TEC on the Flying Hour Cost Report which is sent to CNAP.
This shore activity accounting structure serves two purposes: (1) The collection of cost
information under a standardized system to uniformly identify and report costs to higher
authority; and (2) the collection of cost information in a manner which provides reports
suitable for local management purposes. Because of this latter purpose, shore activity
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accounting structure adds additional levels of cost definition to the levels used by the
Type Commander.
This increased detail of the sources of costs in AOM is provided by Job
Order Numbers (JON's). Local accounting activities and FAADCPAC have developed
JON structures to produce accrued expenses at the various levels required by CNAP but
also with the flexibility to allow collection of detail costs at any level desired by local
management. This includes the capability to distinguish costs by:
1. Departments cost centers, and reimbursable customers.
2. Divisions/Work centers within each department/cost center.
3. Type of material purchased.
Job Order Number's are annotated on all documentation for the
procurement, consumption, application or work request for resources under the
managenent of shore activities and allows the local manager to track the use of budgeted
resources by both customer and provider.
C. Supply System
Parts and materials purchased by AOM funds fall into one of two
categories, consumable or repairable items. As seen from the examples presented in
Table 3-1, consumables are those items with relatively high usage, low price and are
usually disposed of after the end of their useful life. Consumables used in AOM usually
come from the Department of the Navy Stock Fund (DONSF) but can also be obtained
from four other stock funds which provide support to Navy units. These are Department
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of the Army Stock Fund (DOASF), Department of the Air Force Stock Fund (DOAPSF),
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) or General Services Administration (GSA). Though
these funds are operated as separate entities, each can purchase material from one another
or from commercial activities. All of these funds are known as working capital funds or
revolving funds because they are used to purchase and hold inventories of supply items
until needed by customers. Prices of products supplied by these funds cover the costs of
operating the fund. In the case of DONSF, the initial purchase of inventories is made out
of Navy procurement appropriations bit then replacement costs are reimbursed from the
portion of the O&MN appropriation for each customer. The pricing of products by fund
managers also allows for regrouping the costs from obsolescence, loss, transportation and
inflation while price stabilization, expansion of inventory and wartime spares require
direct appropriations. [Ref. 3:p. G-4]
The other category of items used in AOM is the repairable. Repairables
are those items that are large, complex, and/or expensive which can be repaired at a
fraction of the cost required to replace them. The AVDLR portion of AOM consists only
of repairables. The management of repairables ustd in AOM are managed solely by
DONSF via the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) and is similar to the management of
consumables except that repairables required a much more complex administrative system.
When AIMD determines that a part requires depot level maintenance a
Ready For Issue (RFI) part is drawn from a 3tock point and issued to the customer, as a
replacement. The inoperative part, called a :arcass, is required in exchange. If the
operating unit's location or mission requirements does not allow for an exchange when
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TABLE 3-1 SAMPLE LIST OF AOM CONSUMABLE ITEMS
Material Ush
1. Paints, wiping Used in prevention and
rags, towel corrosion control of aircraft,
service, cleaning engines, end
agents, support equipment (SE).
preservatives, and
cutting compounds.
2. Pre-expended bin Pre-expended, consumable
material material meeting requirements
used in maintenance of aircraft,
engines, aircraft components,
SE, etc.
3. Fuels and POL used in I-level maint.,
Lubicants aircraft, hydraulic fluids,
engines, aircraft componepts,
and SE.
4. Hands tools Consumable hands tools used in
maintenance of aircraft,
engines, and aviation ground
support equipment.
5. Saftety/Flight Safety/Flight deck shoes
Deck Shoes used in maintenance
shops, with maintenance support
equipment, or on the flight deck
flight operations by maintenance
personnel only.
6. Packing and Items consumed in packaging/
Preservation preservation of maintenance
material repairables for protection.
7. Special Clothing Authorized special clothing for
unusually dirty work while
performing maintenance on
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issuing the RFI part, the maintenance activity will be charged the full cost of purchasing
a new part called the standard price which is set by ASO. If the old part is turned into
the supply system for repair, the maintenance activity will only be chstrged for average
repair costs for that particular part, called the net price. Net prices average sixty percent
of the standard price but it is not unusual for a piece of electronic equipment to have a
net price of less than ten percent of the standard price. This significant difference in cost
charged to a facility's OPTAR or operating budget emphasizes the importance of ensuring
that old repairables get to their Designated Overhaul Point (DOP) so that the price credit
can be received. In the case of OPTAR holders, this credit is returned to CNAP for
redistribution.
The DONSP is managed at three levels in order to exercise effective
control over the extremely large inventory of parts. At the top, the Naval Supply Systems
Command (NAVSUPSYSCOM) is the stock fund manager and is solely responsible for
the smooth and efficient operations of the stock fund at all leveis. NAVSUP receives
obligational authority for the stock fund and delegates the responsibility for these funds
to the budget project managers. As seen in Table 3-2, budget projects break the range
of stock fund items into commodity groups with Aviation Supply Office (ASO) being
responsible for items needed for AOM. These budget project managers do not actually
carry an inventory but rather conduct the administrative duties such as price setting,
distribution and budget formulation for direct appropriations if needed. [Ref. 3:p. G- 15]
The third level of management of the DONSF is the stock point. Stock
points are responsible for receiving, storing, distributing and accounting for the parts and
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TABLE 3-2 NAVY STOCK FUND ORGANIZATION
BudiEt Proect Commodity Budt Proj Manaster
14 Ships Parts Ships Parts Control
Center
15 Forms Navy Publications and
Forms Center
25 Special Naval Supply Systems
Account Command
21 Commissary Navy Resale Systems
Stores Office
28 General Fleet Material Support
Office
34 Aviation Aviation Supply Office
38 Retail Fuel Fleet Material Support
Office
81 Non-Aviation Ships Parts Control
Center
85 Aviation Aviation Supply Office
Repairables
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material kept in inventory at these sites. Stock points are conveniently located near the
customers they will serve or onboard major aviation ships. [Ref. 3 :p. G-9]
d. Performance Indicators
From the VIDS/MAF's recorded for every maintenance action conducted
and from other supply documents, a system of measurements were identified to gauge the
effectiveness in the execution of AOM funds. [Ref. 7 :p. 37]
These include:
1. System Material Availability (SMA); This represents the percentage of requisitions
that are filled for an item upon request anywhere in the supply system. The item
does not necessarily have to be at a local stock point but is available somewhere
and available for using. Depending on repair time and carcasses being returned
to DOP in a timely manner, the availability of RFI items should stay constant.
2. Level of Repair Execution; If the percentage of AOM funding drastically changes
between AFO and AVDLR, it may indicate problems with the required capabilities
of organizational and intermediate maintenance activities (OMA/IMA). These
problems could include manpower, parts or training.
3. NMCS/PMCS Time; The amount of time an aircraft is not mission capable
because of supply (NMCS) or partially mission capable because of supply (PMCS)
is usually because a required item is not available. This means that either there
are not enough parts in the supply system or maintenance activities are not able
to repair them fast enough for reissue.
4. Subsystem Capability Impact Reporting (SCIR); Similar to reporting NMCS/PMCS
time, this provides detailed information on exactly what items or materials caused
the aircraft not to be fully mission capable (FMC). This information can help in
the control and distribution of vital or high use items.
5. Cannibalization Rates; This indicates the number of times squadron maintenance
personnel remove good parts from one aircraft in order to repair another aircraft.
This practice is discouraged except in those instances when replacement parts are
not available from an ANID or Stock Point and it essential that a particular
aircraft be repaired. A high cannibalization rate is indicative of an ineffective
supply/repair system.
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6. Await~ig Parts (AWP) rate at AIMD's; This is the amount of time it takes an
AIMD to repair an item rather than turning it for depot level work and receive an
RFI in exchange. It is, less expensive for the station to have items repaired locally
so AlMD's are encouraged to hold and repair as many items as possible but this
may cause an excessive amount of time for customers to wait for epaired items.
7. Retrog:ade Time; This is the amount of time it takes for a carcass to reach a DOP
from when it was replaced with a RFI pait. It meastues the effectiveness of the
supply system in tracking carcasses (retrograde) to DOP for repair and reissue.
These measurements assist managers with monitoring the level of success
in accomplishing the primary goal of AOM. This goal is best described in the mission
statement of the AVDLR/AFM project office, that is, "to ensure best AVDLR/AFM
resource utilization for increased mission readiness". [Ref. 13]
Without an effective AOM program to support the material readiness of
the aircraft and aircrew, there can be no sustained mission capability of the Naval Air
Forces which comprise the Flying Hour Program.
D. SUMMARY
The execution of the Flying Ilour Program is designed around a series of systems
for collecting and processing recurring information in order to move effectively use
limited resources. These systems are used Navy wide and known as Resource
Management Systems (RMS).
Since inception in the late. 1950's, RMS decentralized the responsibility for the
proptr and efficient use of appropriated funds down to the lowest possible manager who
can measure the use and cost of resources employed in accomplishing their assigned
missions. It has also allowed the collection of accounting information under a uniforn
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expense account structure so it could be used by the operating manager and at the same
time be consistent with the information used for budgeting [Ref. 3: D-28]. RMS
established responsibilities and relationships between NAVCOMPT, the major claimant,
the administering office and the suballocation (or expense limitation) holders. RMS tied
obligations and expenses directly to appropriations hence the use of activity and
subactivity groups. Finally, RMS established the job order structure which allows the
collection of costs under a uniform expense account structure.
This chapter has examined the accounts, procedures, and repors which make up the
Resource Management Systems of the Flying Hour Program at the Type Commander
level.
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IV. CHALLENGES WITH MANAGING THE FLYING HOUR PROGRAM
A. GENERAL
The basic goal of the Plying Hour Program is to get the most effective air force
possible with the resources provided. Two situations that could prevent this maximizing
return on investment are: 1) Expending more resources than necessary to accomplish a
mission or, 2) Conducting missions that reduce the overall effectiveness of the Flying
Hour Program (FHIP).
This chapter will examine specific circumstances where one of these two
situations occur. Some have to do with invalid or incomplete budget formulation inputs
which cause insuffcient or, at a minimum, inaccurate fiscal requirements to be funded.
Some will address the unnecessary use of the resources for various purposes and others
will point out the need for improved management in different aspects of the Flying Hour
Program.
B. BUDGET FORMULATION FACTORS
1. Cost Per Hour (CPH)
In the budget formulation process, as explained in Chapter Two, the historical
cost per flight hour for each type'modelseries (TMS) is used to calculate the funds
required for future Flying Hour Program needs. This CPH is derived from dividing total
hours flown into total dollars spent in support of those hours and presumes there is a
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direct correlation between costs and flying hours. Besides being calculated for each TMS
of aircraft, CPH is broken down by Aircraft Flight Operation (APO) and Aircraft
Operations Maintenance (AOM) The problem with this method for figuring future
requirements comes primarily from the AOM CPH.
Since a majority of AFO funds finance the fuel requirements of aviation
forces there is a much closer correlation between costs and flight hours than with the
AOM portion of the Flying Hour Program. Although this direct correlation between fuel
costs and flight hours flown validates the use of CPH for predicting future AFO needs,
the CPH used is not always a true representation of fuel costs incurred. This is because
many times fuel is received from sources such as other nations or services and not
charged to the Flying Hour Program. This happens frequently on joint exercises or multi-
national campaigns and there is no record to track fuel usage by Commander Naval Air
Forces Pacific Fleet (CNAP) units because normally the requisition documents are used
for this purpose.
While AFO CPH are not always accurate because of poor tracking of
execution, AOM CPH are not accurate because of the incorrect assumption that there is
an exact correlation between costs and flight hours. As explained earlier in Chapter
Three, too many variables other than flight hours affect AOM costs. These include
environment, age of aircraft, and training of maintenance personnel, just to name a few.
Also, many AOM costs are fixed costs and would not be eliminated with a reduction in
flight hours. AOM costs per hour are even more inaccurate when broken down by TMS
of aircraft as required by budget formulation. In a 1987 evaluation of the Flying Hour
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Cost Report (PHCR) which is submitted by Type Commander, the Comptroller of the
Navy (NAVCOMPT) concluded that:
"The FHCR's are based on the original coding placed on the MAF by the squadron
maintenance personnel. The accuracy of this coding is open to question and is not
routinely and systemically checked either locally or at the fleet level." [Ref. 14 :p.
10]
Since costs per hour used in budget formulation are based on historical costs
incurred, there would not be a problem if the number of flight hours per TMS remained
constant each year but in these times of declining defense budgets the execution CPH will
increase faster than the CPH used for funding. This means even greater cuts to the Plying
Hour Program than those made deliberately by policy makers.
2. Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO)
Current budget formulation procedures use a combination of factors for
calculating Flying Hour Program requirements such as Primary Mission Readiness (PMR),
Crew Seat Ratio (CSR), Aircrew Manning Factor (AMP), and CPH but does not
accurately account for the operational flying hours placed on the system for real world
tasking. These flight time requirements for fleet tasking are in addition to those for
training purposes. The fact that it is not a formal input to the budgeting process can hurt
program funding in two ways. These are:
1. Unexpected requirements for the deployment of air forces in other than training
missions causes an increase to the CPH due to higher fuel consumption, harsher
environments, and greater support requirements associated with deployed
operations. This means funds budgeted for training are used for operational
tasking.
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2. For carrier air wings the budgeted funds cover only 12 months (fiscal year) of the
standard 18 month deployment cycle. This means that an unexpected deployment
of a carrier and its air wing could increase total costs many times than what was
expected since what was budgeted could have been a standdown period when the
air wing is doing minimum flying.
These operational requirements have and will continue to cause major
difficulties with providing sufficient funds for maintaining an effective Flying Hour
Program.
3. Primary Mission Readiness (PMR)
Another factor used in budget formulation which causes difficulty for the
effective management of the Flying Hour Program is Primary Mission Readiness (PMR).
As explained earlier, PMR is the number of flying hours by TMS required for training
per crew usually stated as an average per month. Many PMR's are outdated, invalid
uand/or carried over from the generally accepted standards of other aircraft with similar
missions. An example of this is the 25 hour per month PMR for the F-14A Tomcat.
This 25 hour per month requirement was used as an accepted minimum for aircrews of
the, now retired, F-4 Phantom. Though both are carrier based fighters, the advancement
in technology, mission capabilities and complexity of systems may justify a greater PMR
requirement. Many believe PMR is a level of readiness to achieve, however it is simply
a statement of the flight hours required for each crew to conduct training in a specific
aircraft flight syllabus. PMR has no correlation to the readiness and does not vary with
changes in the expected operating environment, operating tempo (OPTEMPO) or crew
training requirements for operational air forces. This means that budgeted resources will
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not reflect additional real world mission requirements, or the need for increased crew
qualifications to support those missions.
C. PROGRAM EXECUTION FACTORS
1. Staff Hours
There are many supervisory and staff billets which are filled with pilots in a
status known as Duty Involving Flight Operations (DIFOPS), which requires these pilots
to get minimum flight hours for maintaining currency. The principle behind these staff
pilots is that by maintaining minimum qualifications in their particular aircraft they can
be a source of immediate combat augmentation in a wartime situation. Navy regulations
require that to maintain minimum proficiency, pilots must fly at least 100 flying hours
a year. Many pilots in jobs supposedly requiring them to regularly fly do not meet this
minimum. In one survey, of the 930 staff billets designated as those involving flight
operations, 588 had to request waivers for not meeting minimum flying hours. Reasons
for not meeting the minimums were usually because of aircraft availability or because
their qualifications had lapsed and it was too difficult to become requalified. (Ref. 15:,
p. 34]
Because of this, it becomes questionable as to the importance of having these
staff pilots fly at all. The problem with these staff pilots is that they do not count as part
of authorized crew ratios which are used in budget formulation and therefore the hours
they fly must be funded out of the Plying Hour Program for operational forces.
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2. Advancement Flying
A requirement which could degrade the effectiveness of the Flying Hour
Program in times of declining fiscal resources was reported in 1979 as part of a GAO
report and has to do with the minimum flying hours required for aircrew advancement.
Specifically, the CNO and operational commanders have set minimum flight times for
aircrew to advance into billets of increased responsibilities. Examples include: Aircraft
Commander, Flight Leader, and Airborne Tactical Officer. These requirements absorb
flight hours that may be used for other purposes. While &here is no precise number of
flying hours after which an individual is ready to asstume the responsibilities of aircraft
commander, for example, an individual's performmce and capabilities should be
considered on a case-by-case basis rather than depend solely on an arbitrary number of
flying hours before being eligible to demonstrate proficiency and be advanced. Aircrew
who have shown the capability to perform in an advanced position should be allowed to
qualify for that position without having to needlessly fly additional hours. This flexibility
would allow for more effective use of the funds which supported those hours.
3. Simulators
In the summary of findings of a GAO report released in 1976 on the
management of the Flying Hour Program, it recommended that more aviation training
evolutions be conducted with the use of flight simulators. The Navy's response was that
squadron commanding officers are encouraged to use simulators to fly as many authorized
events as possible. The limiting factor for the substitution of simulators for actual flying
was the quantity and quality of simulators available to the fleet. [Ref. 16:p. 84]
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Another GAO report in 1979 also stated that flight simulators were not being
utilized as much as they were available or authorized and when they were used, it was
not as substitution of actual flying evolutions. As an example, two P-3 squadrons at NAS
Moffett Field use simulators for only 72 percent of the qualification exercises that are
authorized to be done in simulators. This resulted an estimated 700 unnecessary actual
flight hours to be flown at a cost of $290,000. [Ref. 15.p. 31]
These statements seem to indicate an ineffective use of resources provided
which could make more funds available for actual flying requirements. Besides the fact
that operating units may not be utilizing simulators to the extent possible, the amount of
simulator time authorized by CNO to account for PMR (currently two percent) in the
budget formulation process has not changed since 1973. If the amount of simulator time
authorized to replace actual flight time is based on the quantity and quality of simulators,
both of which have increased in the last 17 years, then a greater percentage of PMR
should be accomplished with use of simulators.
4. Squadrot countability
Although squadron commanding officers are held directly accountable for
funds allocated to their respective units in the form of an OPTAR, these funds represent
less than half of the total resources provided for CNAP's Flying Hour Program (FHP).
The majority of FHP funds allorated by CNAP go to maintenance facilities in order to
conduct I-level and Depot level maintenance. The use of these services by squadrons are
not thoroughly reviewed for efficiency or effectiveness. Variations in the use of these
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services by squadrons with similar needs are not evaluated for problems in mt
and therefore the potential for waste in using these services could be great.
5. Undelivered Orders
Units which support the Aircraft Operations Maintenance (AOM) requirements
of CNAP squadrons at all levels understand and give greatest attention to the critical
necessity to maintain aircraft in a high readiness status. This causes enormous pressure
on local managers to avoid delays in satisfying material requirements which postpone the
completion of maintenance. Each of the participants, including supply, AIMD's, squadron
maintenance departments, Air Wing Commanders, and CNAP Supply and Material
Readiness Division, actively search for ways to reduce the maintenance delays caused by
the nonavailibility of required items. Techniques used to expedite the receipt of parts
include: local manufacturing, direct commercial purchase, and cannibalization from other
aircraft.
Unfortunately, when one material requirement is satisfied by whatever means,
there is little motivation to cancel the requisition made through the Navy Supply System.
Reasons for this include:
1. The urgency and bulk of current problems overshadow the need to follow-up on
old requests.
2. The need for the material will probably be seen again and older requisitions, when
filled, can be stored as "safety" stock.
3. Personnel are unaware of importance or procedures for canceling unneeded
requisitions.
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4. Personnel who made the original requisition are unaware of the requirement being
filled by other sources.
For whatever reason these unnecessary requisitions are not canceled, they can
cause a strain on the supply system and may delay the maintenance efforts at another
activity. Undelivered orders also tie up Flying Hour Program funds which are obligated
when the orders are placed. These are counted as program executed resources until the
end of the fiscal year when all requisitions are reconciled with local accounting activities
and those no longer required are canceled. This causes an under execution of program
funds which can mean a reduction in resources provided in the future.
6. AIMD Accountability
The costs incurred for Depot Level repair are determined by the number of
beyond the capabilities of maintenance items (BCMs) reported by ARMDs and the
associated net prices charged by depot level repair facilities. The number of BCMs in
turn are influenced by the volume of components inducted for repair and the repair
capability of the AIMD. The volume of components inducted into an AIMD is influenced
by several factors including the number and type of aircraft being supported, the age of
the aircraft, the operating environment, availability of replacements, transient aircraft
support, and many others. Likewise, the repair capability of the AIMD is also influenced
by many factors which include TMS of aircraft supported, afloat or ashore facilities, test
equipment availability, personnel skills, technical information availability level of supply
support, and management philosophy.
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The problem with this system and the many factors involved when attempting
to track AOM execution is that there is no standard performance measure to identify those
facilities whose performance is above or below the norm. The lack of such a
performance measure makes potential problem areas difficult if not impossible to identify
and corrcct. The fleet manager of AOM funds is not able to determine what an individual
AIMD needs as far as manpower, training, equipment, and increased supply support.
Such a measurement standard would also identify those facilities with the most effective
management by tracking the level of parts repaired locally vice turned in for deport level
repair which is more expensive and keeps parts out of the supply system longer.
7. Carcass Tracking System
The carcass tracking system was designed and implemented for the purpose
of tracking Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) carcasses turned in by user
activities to final repair destinations. It provides customers a financial incentive for
rutuming carcasses for repair by charging customers a lower net price when they turn in
the old part in exchange for a new or repaired part. This net price averages 35 percent
of the standard price charged when an old part is not available for turn-in, and therefore
the effectiveness of this carcass tracking system significantly influences the efficient use
of funds and the greatest return on allocated resources.
In a 1987 Naval Audit Service survey on the AVDLR carcass tracking and
billing system, $111.4 million of the sampled $121.4 r illion reported as lost items from
nine activities were not actual asset losses. Of those reported losses, an estimated $25.4
million were actually received but not recorded by the Navy Aviation Supply Office
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(ASO), the command responsible for managing the aviation carcass tracking system. [Ref.
17 :p. 2]
In the survey of six Naval Air Stations, the Naval Audit Service discovered
$32.6 million in erroneous billings. Financial managers at field activities were unable to
properly manage AVDLR funds to prevent such overcharges because ASO uses an
automated carcass tracking and financiai system not designed to interface with local
computer systems. [Ref. 17.p. 3]
8. Measuring Output
The primary method for identifying the combat readiness of all military units
is through the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) known in the Navy U
the Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP), it is an internal Depamnent of Defense
report used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to monitor the war fighting capability of
operating forces. In the case of naval aviation squadrons it is used as an indirect
measurement of the effectiveness of the Flying Hour Program, that is, the ability to
translate fiscal appropriations into operational readiness. Specifically, the UNITREP
reports a rating from one to five (one being fudly combat ready) in several broad
categories of readiness including: personnel, equipment, supply, and support. JCS uses
the UNITREP to form the JCS capability report and the JCS posture statement which are
used to brief Congress and the President on the status of military forces. [Ref. 8:p. 581
One problem with this system is its objectivity. Since it is the responsibility
of each squadron commandi'ng officer to submit this report, which is reviewed by his
immediate operational commanders including CNAP, a rating of his own unit may not
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indicate potential problems to the extent it should or the need for additional resources.
Another problem with the UNrTREP rating system is that is does not differentiate
between factors that can be controlled by local managers and those that can not and
therefore it is not a very valuable tool for measuring the management effectiveness of the
Fl) ing Hour Program. Below are two cases where factors causing lower readiness ratings
are out of the local managers control.
I. The training matrix used to identify flight evolutions required for aircrew to stay
current is augmented with Additional training evolutions to support a newly
recognized mission capability without a conresponding increase in program funds
to finance the additional flight hours.
2. Whether because of retention, recriftment, or training rate the squadron aircrew
manning level is greater than expected thus requiring more flight hours to keep
aircrewman proficient.
Neither of these situations is Ln indication of a poorly managed squadcon but
the UNTREP rating system would not clearly indicate this fact. This is one reason why
Type Commanders use secondary measures of management effectiveness such obligation
rates, matching historical execution standards, and meeting expense limitations, but these
do not measure the amount of output (readirness) achieved with a given amount of input
(dollars).
D. SUMMARY
This Chapter has presented serveral weaknesses with the current administration
procedures usPed in the Flying Hour Program that can cause challenges to the effective
management by CNAP. Some of these weaknesses are in the budget formulation phase
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of the Flying Hour Program and therefore not under the control of the Type Commander.
CNAP must work &round these deficiencies in such a manner as to minimize their affect
on mission accomplishment until changes are made to ijprove the present system. Other
weaknesses presented iuv under the control of the Type Commander and should be
studied more closely in order to analyze the best alternatives.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
A. GENERAL
This chapter presents recommendations to problems presented in Chapter Four.
These are not to be taken as the best possible alternatives but as a starting point for
further analysis. The final solutions should result in increasing the effective and efficient
utiliztion of the limited resources provided for obtaining maximum readiness.
B. BUDGET FORMULATION FACTORS
1. Cost Per Hour (CPH)
As stated in Chapter Three, the Aviation Fleet Maintenance/Aviation Depot
Level Repairable (AFM/AVDLR) Project Office at CNAP is actively pursuing help with
deterinnig the different variables which correlate with Flying Hour Program costs
besides the number of flight hours flown. Though much progress has been made to
identify those variables that affect certain costs such as AOM than just flight hours, the
AFM/AVDLR Project Office is seeking greater research assistance from sources such as
the Naval Postgraduate School to stetistically isolate those variables which have the
greatest impact on costs and therefore provide the best indicators for predicting future
requirements. Students n•I the Operations Research Department would have the tools
necessary to help CNAP formulate the equations for calculating an estimated requirement
for Flying Hour Program funds. Students from the Computer Science Department could
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also possibly provide a customized computer database system for facilitating budget input
formulation and program execution tracking.
2. OPTEMPO
A database should be initiated to collect operating costs of naval air forces not
only by TMS but also by the specific mission scenario which caused those costs to be
incurred. Mission codes on aircrew flight time reporting documents should be correlated
with maintenance documents to determine total costs for performing each mission. Also,
the budgeting period of 12 months should have the flexibility to support the Flying Hour
Program when there are changes in the 18 month deployment cycle of carrier air wings.
3. Primary Mission Readiness (PMR)
In order to use PMR for allocating funds and in a manner consistent with its
use in budget formulation, it should correlate exclusively to the training of aircrew.
Another budget input should be used to account for costs associated with changes in
OPTEMPO, operating environment and missions. The percentage of PMR, resulting from
decisions by the CNO as to an acceptable minimum flight time per aircrew should
remain constant over the years but total hours (100 percent PMR) should be adjusted up
(or down) with changes made to OPTEMPO , area of operation (environment) and
missions conducted. When fiscal constraints make it impossible to fund additional hours,
the training matrix for each TMS of sarcraft should be prioritized so that squadrons
achieve maximum return on training resources provided by the Flying Hour Program.
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C. PROGRAM EXECUTION FACTORS
1. Staff Hours
The Navy should examine the supervisory and staff billets which currently
require pilots to fly a minimum number of hours each year. If the billets are justified
then they should be included in dte budget formulation process and fully funded. If not,
they should have they flying requirements dropped and the funds supporting those flight
hours reallocated to other segments of the Flying Hour Program.
2. Simulators
A study should be performed to evaluate appropriate levels of simulator use
in place of actual flight t~me by type/model/series (TMS) aircraft and a system developed
to provide local managers the motivation for using simulators as much as appropriate.
Currently, since funding for simulators is not part of the Flying Hour Program, any
increase in the use of simulators translates to a reduction in funds for actual flying
activities. Also, local managers currently have more flexibility over funds for actual
flying then with those for simulators. Operators, many of whom are in management
positions, always prefer actual flying over simulators except for evolutions that can not
be performed safely in an actual aircraft.
3. Squadron AccountabIity
A system needs to be initiated that will delegate more responsibility for
effective AOM fund execution to the sq.,,ý-:rons where the lowest level managers use
these funds in accomplishing their missions. Currently only a small portion of Aircraft
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Operations Maintenance (AOM) fund execution is managed at the squadron level as part
of their Operating Target (OPTAR). The Operating Budgets of CNAP and the various
Naval Air Stations support AOM requirements of squadron through maintenance facilities
but no direct measurement of the efficient use of these services is available or used.
There are indicators of ineffective use of AOM by aviation units but these are not
thorough enough or always used to provide corrective feedback. One of these is the
number of instances a squadron turns a part into AIMD for repair only to be told it is not
in need of repair or the repair should be done at the squadron level. Called A-799's
because of the maintenance code used at AIMD's on documents to record such instances,
an excessive number could indicate an ineffective squadron maintenance department. (Ref.
7:p. 44]
Type Commanders need a financial guideline and feedback mechanism to
determine when excessive costs are being incurred by squadrons, ships or MAGs. Flying
hour norms should be developed for AOM costs and performance evaluated against these
norms.
Also, additional emphasis must be placed on timely data accumulation. This
should include a method to identify data that is either missing or estimated of Budget
OPTAR Reports (BORs). The Type Commander should, as a minimum, validate the
reasonableness of hours flown compared with anticipated costs.
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4. Undellvered Orders
Though much has been initiated to reduce the rate of unnecessary requisitions
being carried and fulfilled there still exists the need for closer controls over undelivered
orders.
One procedure used to provide closer scrutiny over requisitions is the Material
Outstanding Validations (MOV) program which requires activities to conduct quarterly
outstanding obligation validations. All Naval Air Stations, aircraft carriers and MAG's
are required to have a thorough outstanding obligation validation program encompassing
supply, AIMD, and squadrons. Through these validations CNAP should be able to
identify those undelivered orders that are still required and those that should be canceled
which will indicate those activities who have poor tracking systems. However, Naval
Audit Service and fleet commander supply and material readiness inspections have noted
a lack of an effective undelivered order review process. In general, the use of external
audits and inspections are deterrents but to make significant improvements in the number
of unnecessary undelivered orders, internal management must focus on better controls and
dedicated resources to the task.
5. AIMD Accountlblllty
In order to enable the Type Commander to measure the performance of
AIMDs in other than fscal terms, a standardization of performance measure must be
initiated at all I-level maintenance facilities. This performance standard system would
include standard equipment lists, personnel training, supplies and technical publications.
It would also provide a standard list of parts that all AIMDs should be capable of
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repairing. No longer would claiming beyond their capability be an excuse for not
repairing a badly needed part.
The initiation of such a system would provide CNAP with a method of
measuring the effectiveness of AOM funds in terms of individual maintenance facilities
output whihc can create the motivation to increase overall program effectiveness.
6. Carcass Tracking System
From the 1987 survey conducted by the Naval Audit Service on the carcass
tracking and billing, system much has been done to improve the effectiveness of the
system. This includes implementation of some of the following recommendations. [Ref.
17 :p. 12]
1. Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) provide definitive guidance to
Aviation Supply Office (ASO) and field activities for investigating, surveying, and
reconciling lost Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) carcasses and establish
ASO as the coordinator of these reviews.
2. ASO investigate losses recorded on the carcass tracking system, coordinate
appropriate surveys, reverse invalid losses, and adjust onhand balances when
appropriate.
3. NAVSUP reemphasize the need for Naval supply centers to promptly report
receipts of AVDLR carcasses to ASO and monitor performance during command
inspections.
4. ASO strictly enforce contractual clauses requiring contractors to report receipts of
AVDLR carcasses to ASO promptly.
5. ASO forward followup inquiries to all shipping destinations, including contractors,
Naval activities, and other services' repair centers, that do not acknowledge receipt
of AVDLR carcasses.
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6. NAVSUP determine the feasibility of identifying AVDLR carcasses at the point
of shipment using an automated marking and recording system to avoid future data
entry errors.
The recommraendation for ASO to reemphasize prompt reporting and accurate
tracking must also apply to CNAP for the proper control of carcasses at the squadron and
AIMD levels. Many times squadron personnel me not aware of the need of procedures
for retuining carcasses (retrograde). This happens frequently on deployment when
retrograde will be stowed onboard a Navy ship for serveral months until rtturn to home
port before it is turned into the supply system.
CNAP must develop a method of training and motivating local units to
promptly turn in and accurately document carcasses while deployed.
7. Measuring Output
Responding to the criticism in a 1989 Government Accounting Office (GAO)
report that the Flying Hour Program management controls insure that commanders do
exceed total dollar allocations but do not link requirements or resource expenditures to
any measure of program acheivement, the Navy has an on-going research project aimed
at developing objective relationships between flying hours and indicators of operational
performance. This study, started in May 1988, will most likely require the Navy to
transition to a different budget methodology for TACAIR/ASW flying hours since the
current determination of readiness resulting from trainng activity is not an entirely
objective process. Until then, the Navy will maintain Primary Mission Readiness (PMR)
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as the budgetary and allocation input until a more meaningful measure of requirements
and performance is complete and operational. [Ref. l:p. 43]
D. CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented recommendations to problems examined in Chapter Four.
Although no specific procedures are given, the emphasis has been to offer possible areas
where altcmatives could be found and to serve as a catalyst for further graduate research.
As with the aircraft themselves, the Flying Hour Program management must be
constantly improving to provide the greatest return on investment, especially in the
coming years of fiscal constmints.
The Type Commander is a dominant force in the Flying Hour Program and must
walk the tight rope between efficient program execution and the "use or lose" budgetary
process. A basic understanding of the management procedures and responsibilities of





AFM Aviation Fleet Maintenance
AIM Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department
AMP Aircrew Manning Factor
AOM Aircraft Operations Maintenance
APF Annual Planning Figure
ASO Aviation Supply Office
ASW Antisubmarine Warfare
AVDLR Aviation Depot Level Repairable
AWP Awaiting Parts
BCM Beyond Capability of Maintenance
BOR Budget OFTAR Report
CINPACFLT Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNAL Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
CNAP Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
COMNAVAIRLANT Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
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COMNAVAIRPAC Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet
CPH Cost Per Hour
CSR Crew Seat Ratio
CV Aircraft Carrier
DLR Depot Level Repairable
DOD Department of Defense
DON Department of the Navy
DOP Designated Overhaul Point
FAADC Fleet Accounting and Disbursing Center
FHCR Flying Hour Cost Report
FHP Flying Hour Program
FMC Fully Mission Capable
FRS Fleet Readiness Squadron
FY Fiscal Year
GAO General Accounting Office
GSA General Services Administration
IMA Intermediate Maintenance Activity
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
MAO Marine Air Group
MC Mission Capable
MOV Material Obligation Validation
MTIS Material Turned Into Store
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14ARF ? Iaval Air Rework Facility
NAS Naval Air Station
NAVCOMPT Navy Comptroller
NAVSUP Navy 1,kiply Systems Command
NACSUPSYSCOM Navy Supply Systems Command
NMCS Not Mission Capable Supply
NRFI Not Ready For Issue
NSF Navy Stock Fund
0:22 Operpting Budget
OFC , •t• jAR Functional Categories
O&MN Operation and Maintenance, Navy
O&M,NR Operation and Maintenance, Navy Reserve




OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
PMR Primary Mission Readiness
PMCS Partial Mission Capable Supply
POL Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants
POM Program Objcctive Memorandum
PPBS Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
70
RFI Ready For Issue
RMS Resource Management System
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SECNAV Secretary of the Navy
SYDP Six Year Defense Plan
TACAIR Tactical Air Forces
TEC "'ype Equipment Code
TMS Type Model Series
TYCOM Type Commander
UNITREP Unit Statws and Identity Report
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